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Abstract
In recent times, research in the field of complex networks has advanced by leaps and
bounds. Researchers have developed mathematical models for different networks such as
epidemic networks, computer networks, power grid networks, and so on. In this thesis, the
power grid has been modeled as a complex network.
The power grid is being used extensively in every field today. Our dependence on the
power grid has exceeded to an extent that we cannot think of survival without electricity.
Recently, there has been an increasing concern about the growing possibility of cascading
failures, due to the fact that the power grid is works close to full utilization. Furthermore,
the problem will be exacerbated by the need to transfer a large amount of power generated by
renewable sources from the regions where it is produced to the regions where it is consumed.
Many researchers have studied these networks to find a solution to the problem of network
robustness. Topological analysis may be considered as one of the components of analysis of
a system’s robustness.
In the first part of this thesis, to study the cascading effect on power grid networks from
a topological standpoint, we developed a simulator and used the IEEE standard networks
for our analysis. The cascading effect was simulated on three standard networks, the IEEE
300 bus system, the IEEE 118 bus test system, and the WSCC 179 bus equivalent model.
To extend our analysis to a larger set of networks with different topologies, we developed
a first approximation network generator the creates networks with characteristics similar
to the standard networks but with different topologies. The generated networks were then
compared with the standard networks to show the effect of topology on the robustness
of power grid networks. A comparison of the network metrics for the standard and the
generated networks indicate that the generated networks are more robust than the standard
ones. However, even if the generated topologies show an increased robustness with respect
to the standard topologies, the real implementation and design of power grids based on
those topologies requires further study, and will be considered as future work.
In the second part of this thesis, we studied two mitigation strategies based on load
reduction, Homogeneous load reduction and Targeted range-based load reduction. While
the generic Homogeneous strategy will only mitigate the severity of the cascade when a
non-negligible load reduction is performed, our newly proposed Targeted load reduction
strategy is much more efficient, reducing the load only in a small portion of the grid. The
determination of this special portion of the grid is based on an algorithm, which finds the
paths supplying power from the generators to the nodes. This algorithm is described in
details in the Appendix B. While the Homogeneous strategy is easier to implement, efficient
results can be obtained using the Targeted strategy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Complex Networks
In recent times, the field of complex networks has made great advances. Many real world
systems such as WWW, Internet, and Power Grids have been modeled as complex networks
and a topological analysis of these systems has been carried out1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. To un-
derstand the basic concepts of complex networks and the approach used in this thesis, some
of the definitions and terminology have been listed below3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.
In most of the previous work in this field a purely topological approach has been used
and more importance has been given to the network metrics. However, in this thesis, care
has been taken to incorporate power flow dynamics of the network along with the topological
aspect of the network.
1.1 Some definitions
1. Graph: A simple graph G(V, E) is usually a set of vertices V and edges E connecting
these vertices. A multi-graph is a graph with multiple edges between the same vertices.
A graph is called a digraph if the edges of the graph are directed.
2. Network: In simple words, a graph with flows is called a network.
3. Nodes: Each of the vertices in the set V are called nodes. The nodes may represent
routers in the Internet or people of different nationalities in a social network.
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4. Links: Each of the edges in the set E are called links. Links connect nodes, indicating
the relationship between them. Links can carry weights, representing a certain char-
acteristic of a network. For example, weights may represent the traffic conditions in
the Internet or impedances in a power grid. Edges can be directed, pointing in one
direction and forming a digraph. A graph may have hyperedges - edges that join more
than two vertices together.
5. Adjacency matrix: It is a square matrix with the rows and columns representing all
the nodes of the network. It gives a node-node relationship of a network. Whenever
a link exists between two nodes, the corresponding element of the adjacency matrix is
1, else it is 0. A weighted adjacency matrix contains a non-zero weight instead of a 1,
when a connection exists.
6. Node degree: It is the number of edges connected to a node. In other words, it is
the number of edges that end at a node. A directed graph has an in-degree and an
out-degree indicating the number of incoming and outgoing edges, respectively.
The average node degree is the average number of edges connecting the vertices in the
graph. The average node degree of a graph is given by
< k >=
2 ∗m
n
(1.1)
where m is the number of links and n is the number of nodes in the network.
7. Degree distribution: Let n(k) be the number of nodes of degree k (k-degree nodes).
The node degree distribution is the probability that a randomly selected node is k-
degree:
P (k) =
n(k)
n
(1.2)
8. Clustering coefficient: This measure assesses the degree to which nodes tend to cluster
together. Evidence suggests that in most real-world networks, and in particular social
networks, nodes tend to create tightly knit groups characterized by a relatively high
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density of ties. In real-world networks, this likelihood tends to be greater than the
average probability of a tie randomly established between two nodes. Two versions of
this measure exist - local and global. Local clustering of a node in a graph quantifies
how close it’s neighbors are to forming a clique (complete graph). If mnn(k) is the
average number of links between the neighbors of k-degree nodes, local clustering is
the ratio of this number to the maximum possible such links. It is the average number
of 3-cycles involving k-degree nodes.
C(k) =
2 ∗mnn(k)/k
k − 1 (1.3)
9. Geodesic path: A geodesic path is the shortest path through the network from one node
to another. The number of edges traversed by the shortest connecting path between
two vertices i and j or a source-destination path with the optimal sum of weights
is called the shortest path length and denoted as lij. It is a symmetric quantity for
undirected graphs but it does not coincide, in general, for the directed graphs. The
shortest path may be measured in terms of hop count or distance.
10. Characteristic path length: Average distance, characteristic path length, and average
shortest path, all refer to the same metric. It is the average value of lij over all the
possible pairs of vertices in the network.
< l >=
∑
i,j lij
N(N − 1) (1.4)
It is the sum of all source-destination shortest paths divided by the number of node
pairs in the network.
11. Hop Count: Hop count is a measure which is defined as the number of links in the
shortest path of a source-destination pair in the network. In a simple network with
homogeneous weights on all links, equal to unity, the hop count would be the addition
of weights in the shortest path from the source to the destination.
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12. Diameter: The diameter is defined as the longest shortest path between any source-
destination pair in the network.
dG = max(lij) (1.5)
When a network is disrupted, some of the links or nodes that are deleted may con-
stitute a part of the shortest path in the network. So the shortest path after the
disruptions may become longer than it was originally. Thus, disruptions reduce the
global connectivity of the network by increasing the diameter. If the disruptions are
severe enough to fragment the network, the diameter becomes infinite.
13. Betweenness Centrality: It is defined as the number of shortest paths between pairs of
vertices that pass through a given vertex. More precisely, if phj is the total number of
shortest paths from h to j and phj(i) is the number of these shortest paths that pass
through the vertex i, the betweenness of i is defined as
bi =
∑
h6=j 6=i phj(i)
phj
(1.6)
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Chapter 2
Power grids as complex networks
2.1 Motivation
Commonly known as blackouts, there have been a number of incidents of power grid cas-
cading failures, recently. The United States Northeast blackout of 2003 was one of the
major blackouts within the last decade. Some of the others were the blackouts in United
Kingdom, Denmark, and Italy, which took place within weeks or months of the U.S. black-
out18, 19. There were other blackouts in Brazil in 2005, and in Switzerland in 2009, and
many more in different parts of the world. Cascading outages were once thought to be rare
incidents but are becoming common in recent times. Such incidents have led to an interest
among researchers to understand power grid dynamics in greater depths.
Power grids are among the most complex technological systems ever developed6. Today,
electric energy is significantly being used in every walk of life. This ever-growing demand
for electricity is putting a tremendous pressure on the power grid, which transmits and
distributes this electricity. When the power grids were designed initially, they were not
designed to handle this amount of pressure. However, the advancement of technology and
automation of devices in modern times is increasing the demand for reliable energy which
calls for an increase in the efficiency of the power grids, both by better technology for trans-
mission and distribution, as well as by redesign and restructuring.
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The power grid can be thought of as having three subsections: Generation, Transmission,
and Distribution. Transmission section may further have one or more sub-transmission
sections. In this work, we have studied the transmission section of the grid, with generation
as an integral part. While analysis of power grids as a power flow problem is important, it
is also important to evaluate them from a topological standpoint because topology plays an
important role in determining the robustness of a network.
The following are the important features of the power grid as a complex network:
1. Node Degree Distribution: Most of the nodes in the network have a low degree, usually
close to the average node degree, defined in Chapter 1. There are very few nodes with
a high degree. In other words, the node degree follows a Poisson distribution20. The
node degree distribution for a 300 bus power grid network is shown in Fig. 2.1.
2. Load Distribution: There are very few nodes handling a very heavy load. In other
words, the load follows a Power Law distribution1. Fig. 2.2 shows the load distribution
for a 300 bus power grid network.
3. Flow Routing: The flow dynamics depend greatly on its electrical characteristics, one
of them being the impedances of transmission lines. Power flows through the least
resistive path, and thus the amount of power flowing through the transmission lines
is inversely proportional to their impedances.
It has been mentioned in literature by many power systems researchers that usually, the
power grid is robust against single component failures. This is true, in the sense that if
a single line gets overloaded or breaks, its power is immediately re-routed to a different
line and the disturbance can, usually, be suspended. However, in case of an overloaded
system, the redistribution of power leads to the subsequent overloading of other lines, and
the consequence could be a cascade of overloading failures. In this thesis, we have considered
the base case of a system working close to its maximum capacity. The authors of21 have
described the presence of a hidden failure phenomenon in power grids and have presented a
6
Figure 2.1: Node Degree Distribution for a power grid network
model for the same. Hidden failures in the power grid are exposed in the event of abnormal
operating conditions such as overloading, and these failures lead to the spreading of an
initial single component failure. Such failures may involve the incorrect or false tripping of
protective relays.
One general way to define a network to be robust from a topological viewpoint is to say
that its components cannot be easily disconnected22. In other words, a network is robust
if the removal of one or few network elements does not cause it to fragment into a number
of components. In this thesis, we define a network to be robust when the failure of one
component and the consequent cascade of failures minimally reduces the power delivered to
the loads.
In the next section, the related work in this field is discussed. Chapter III presents the
simulation of the cascading failure on standard networks, followed by the generation of
random networks, in Chapter IV. Chapter V discusses the mitigation strategies for the
power grid network, and the results, conclusions, and future work are presented in Chapter
VII, followed by Appendices A, and B
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Figure 2.2: Load Distribution for a power grid network
2.2 Related Work
Study of the impact of topology on a network is important because it has an important role
to play in the determination of robustness of a network. Most earlier research in power grid
as a complex network has mainly addressed the static properties of the network1, 2, 3.
In7, the authors have considered the power transmission grid as a complex network
in which the energy is exchanged between every pair of nodes and transmitted along the
shortest path connecting them. They have considered the concept of a finite capacity for
every node in the network, the total load on each node being the total number of shortest
paths passing through that node, in agreement with4, 23, 24. This load was also called as
betweenness centrality. They have tried to prove that cascading effect is more likely to take
place in a network with a high heterogeneity of load. Their results show that scale-free net-
works experience cascading failures more easily than the homogeneous networks. However,
it must be noted here that although the power grid networks show less heterogeneity in the
node degree but a high heterogeneity in the node load, the load is not the betweenness but
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the actual consumption in MW. Some of the nodes handle a heavy load while most others
handle medium or light load.
Load has been considered as betweenness or number of shortest paths passing through
a node in some previous works. In25, the efficiency model introduced in26 has been used to
evaluate the redistribution dynamics of a given system before and after removal of nodes.
This model, used by several complex networks researchers states that efficiency of exchanging
information between two nodes is the inverse of the shortest distance between them. The
most efficient paths are thus the same as the shortest paths between any two nodes. However,
it seems unsuitable to consider shortest paths for a power grid network because the flow of
power between two nodes depends on the electrical characteristics of the nodes and the link
carrying the power. As a result, this model was not used for our analysis.27 uses the same
model with slight variations. The authors of this work have said that the overloaded nodes
are not removed from the network but the information passing through the overloaded nodes
gets worse so that eventually these nodes will be avoided and the shortest paths will change.
The load on each node is the number of most efficient or shortest paths passing through it.
They reduce the efficiency of the node inversely proportional to the load on the node at the
given time instant.
Attacks on nodes as well as on links has been considered in8. Like the other previous
research, this work too has spoken about the robust-yet-fragile property of heterogeneous
networks. The heterogeneity is considered in loads where the definition of load is still be-
tweenness centrality. The networks are considered to be robust for random failures and
fragile for intentional attacks. The cascade causing nodes are the ones with a higher be-
tweenness/load or higher connectivity/degree. The authors of this publication have used the
model proposed by them in another paper7. All these studies are mainly focused on scale-
free networks because of the heterogeneity aspect that has been incorporated into them.
Similar concepts and analysis has been addressed in some other papers such as5, 28. The
authors have explicitly mentioned in their publication9 that they have neglected the details
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of the electromagnetic processes and focused only on the topological properties of the grid.
However, they also agree that their model may be too simple to be used in the real world.
Another aspect of cascading dynamics has been considered in21, 29, 30, 31 based on a hidden
failure model. The first of these references is an improved hidden failure model over the
other three. The hidden failure model suggested that a hidden failure is undetectable during
normal operation but will be exposed as a direct consequence of other system disturbances
such as failure of a network element and consequent overloading of some lines, which might
cause a relay system to incorrectly and inappropriately disconnect network elements. These
analyses are totally from a power systems perspective and do not involve much topological
analysis.
More attention has been given to the flow dynamics lately, and32 has a discussion on the
point that the ability of a transmission grid to perform properly depends on its topological
structure, and on the impedance and flow limits of its lines. The authors have discussed the
problems associated with the general definition of vulnerability based on global efficiency
of power grid networks, as mentioned in7, 9, 33, and others. Efficiency has been replaced
by net-ability in32 and a comparison is shown between the two metrics. The authors of
this work have also considered link characteristics, adding that the capacity of a link is
the maximum amount of power it can carry and this power is inversely proportional to the
line impedance. The authors of34 have explained very clearly that the power grids differ
substantially from the preferential attachment model1 as well as the small-world model3.
They say that these abstract models do not provide much utility for modeling power grids.
Power grids have high clustering coefficient but not as high as small world networks. At
the same time, they show exponential degree distribution like the random graphs. They
have outlined the differences between the topological and electrical structure of the power
grids and proposed a graph-generating algorithm that produces random networks that are
roughly similar to what is found in the real power grids, except for the negative assortativity.
It has been discussed in35 that a topological approach must be supported by a power grid
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model to give more accurate results than those obtained from a purely topological aspect.
The authors have used three measures of vulnerability to find the impact of random failures
and directed attacks on the power grid, the first two being purely topological measures.
The work in this thesis highlights this very aspect of using a power flow model and flow
dynamics to measure the vulnerability of the power grid, along with using a topological
approach.
11
Chapter 3
Simulation of Cascading Effect
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation(NERC) defines a cascading failure as
”The uncontrolled loss of any system facilities or load, whether because of thermal overload,
voltage collapse, or loss of synchronism, except those occurring as a result of fault isola-
tion”36. In most real transportation/communication networks, the breakdown of a single or
of a very small size group of elements can be sufficient to cause the entire system to collapse,
due to the dynamics of redistribution of flows on the networks28.
To simulate the cascading effect on power grid networks, we considered three standard
networks: IEEE 300 bus test system37, IEEE 118 bus test system37, and WSCC 179 bus
equivalent model. A simplified model, the DC Power Flow model21, 32, 38 is used for this
analysis. Due to some of the assumptions listed below, this model is suitable for such an
analysis39, as it removes the non-linearities of the system. This model is also known as a
linearized model because it gives a solution of simultaneous linear power flow equations.
The complete description of the DC Power Flow model is given later, in Appendix A. The
method uses matrices for the different physical quantities such as power flow, phase angles,
and impedances of the network. A full-blown AC analysis becomes very complicated for the
topological study of the grid. Hence, the DC model was considered appropriate for such a
study, under some assumptions39.
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3.1 The Model
The power grid can be modeled as a circuit with resistances, inductors, and capacitors.
The model is explained in details in Appendix A. Some of the assumptions associated with
the DC Power Flow model are:
1. All voltages have a magnitude of 1 per unit or 1 p.u., which means that the voltage
profile is flat and all voltages are equal. Hence, we consider only the phase angle of
the voltage in calculations.
2. The voltage angle difference is small, and consequently sinδ ≈ δ.
3. Resistances are very small as compared to inductive reactances, i.e. R << L. Hence,
they are neglected.
Some additional approximations that were made are:
1. Loads are static, which means that they do not change with time
2. The problem is considered in discrete time
In spite of these approximations, the DC model takes into account the important elec-
trical properties, such as the impedances, to find the paths from the generator to each node.
The DC model also takes into account the direction of power flow which is often neglected
in a topological analysis of the power grid. Overall, the DC model is quite suitable for
such an analysis because it considers the most important electrical properties, while pre-
vious research in complex networks has used a model based on shortest path for power
flow9, 8, 28, 27.
The power grid can be modeled as a complex network by considering that the transmis-
sion lines are the links of the network, and the power substations (and generators) are the
nodes, as shown in Fig. 3.1. The impedances of the transmission lines are the weights on
the links.
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Figure 3.1: Modeling the transmission grid as a complex network
3.2 Data set
The IEEE 300 node network has a section of 247 nodes and two other subsections of nodes
which were not very well-connected with the main section and were not important for
topological analysis. These two subsections were removed, leaving 247 nodes in the network.
Therefore, the 300 node system is referred to as the 247 node network here onwards, unless
we refer to the standard case.
For the simulation, we take the load information and the link information from the data
sheets available for these networks37. The load on the nodes is the consumption at each node
in MW. The amount of load handled by each node is different, with some nodes handling
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a heavy load while others do not. In reality, the load or demand changes at every time
step. The capacity of a node is the sum of the load it serves and the power it sends out on
adjacent links. However, there are some nodes which handle no load at all but are present
just for the purpose of transferring power from one node to another.
The link information consists of the list of the pairs of vertices that every edge connects.
The link and load information suggests that power grid networks are quite homogeneous in
their node degree distribution, with the average node degree between 2.5 and 3.5. The
degree of a node is the number of edges that end at that node. We then populate a
weighted adjacency matrix {xij} using the link information and the corresponding weights
(line impedances) of each link. These weights are the elements of the matrix. The load and
link information is then used with the DC Power Flow model to calculate the phase angles,
and eventually, the power flow in each link of the network. The main generator is named as
the reference node and is assigned a phase angle of 0 degree. All the other phase angles are
calculated with reference to this phase angle, i.e, all the other angles are smaller as compared
to the reference angle. This is because electric current flows from a higher electric potential
to a lower electric potential. Thus, the angles determine the direction of power flow. Any
removal of system elements is capable of disturbing the balance of flows, leading to their
redistribution and recalculation of all the associated physical quantities. The direction of
flow might also be affected by any intentional or accidental removal of network elements. In
general, the system is assumed to be operating at maximum capacity.
To simulate the cascading failure, we select one of the links and remove it from the
network. The power carried by this link should be redistributed among the neighbors and
so all the parameters such as the adjacency matrix, load vector, phase angles, and link powers
should be resized, recalculated, and updated. This is the first stage of failure, known as
the first iteration. Since all the links are operating close to their maximum capacity, the
redistribution might cause some of the links to become overloaded and to fail. Now, the
power carried by these newly failed links has to be redistributed, and once again recalculation
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and updating of quantities must be done. This is the second iteration. This procedure is
repeated until there are no more overloaded links. This network condition is reached due
to the fact that removing failed links also removes loads and progressively the total load is
reduced to a level that can be managed by the network. At this point, the system is said
to have attained the state of stability.
We individually use each link in the network as the initial failure and record the number
of additional failures it causes consequently. We assume that a failure of more than 10%
of the nodes is a serious outage. We classify the links into two categories: Critical and
Non-Critical. Critical links are those which, if removed, will cause more than or equal to
10% damage to the network, and Non-Critical links are those which cause less than 10%
damage on removal. Thus, links which cause more than or equal to 10% damage were said
to cause a cascading effect on the network.
In addition to the number of nodes failed, we use power degradation as a measure to
quantify the severity of the damage from cascading failures. Power degradation is defined as
the loss in power as compared to the original power on the system before the failure40. We
note the total remaining load on the system in every iteration and plot a graph of current
load versus iteration number. We determine the worst-case power degradation graphs for
the 247, 179, and 118 node networks. By worst-case we mean that the simulation is carried
out for the most critical link which causes the maximum damage to the network in terms
of links failed. In fact, power degradation for different networks is proportional to their link
losses and it is appropriate to determine the worst-case using link loss.
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Chapter 4
Network Generation: Creation of
Topologies
To study the effect of topology on network robustness, topologies other than the standard
IEEE topologies were required for analysis. Since the power grid is a critical infrastruc-
ture, it is very difficult to obtain information about its structure and data. To overcome
this problem, we developed a ”‘first approximation”’ network generator to generate more
topologies.
However, to make the generated network close to the realistic network, we imposed the
constraints that the average and maximum node degree of the generated networks be the
same as that of the standard networks. This constraint is due to the physical limitations of
the nodes (substations) that cannot have an arbitrarily high number of transmission lines
originating from them.
The number of nodes, average node degree, and maximum node degree were given as
inputs to the generator and the output was the edge list of the generated network. The
edge list is a list of the pairs of vertices that connect all the edges in the network. These
connections are made keeping in mind the constraints, and avoiding self-loops and multiple
edges between pairs of nodes. We generated the loads and inductances probabilistically,
using the data in the data sheets for the three standard networks. The ”first approxima-
tion” generator models the generated networks based on the node degree distribution of the
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original networks. Thus, there will be a family of networks that can be generated with the
same degree distribution. The node degree distributions of the original 247 node network
and five of the family of new 247 node networks is shown in 4.4. The original and generated
topologies for the 247, 179, and 118 node networks are shown in Fig. 4.1, Fig. 4.2, and
Fig. 4.3, respectively.
Figure 4.1: Standard(left) and Generated 247 node networks
The same procedure, as that used for the standard networks, is applied for the gener-
ated networks for simulating failures. The most critical link is removed initially and the
redistribution dynamics are studied.
Interestingly, results show that the generated networks are more robust against cascading
failures than the standard networks. By this it is meant that the power degradation and node
loss for each of the generated networks is less than that of the standard networks. However,
the generated networks themselves vary in the level of robustness with some generated
networks being more robust than the others, in the same family.
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Figure 4.2: Standard(left) and Generated 179 node networks
Figure 4.3: Standard(left) and Generated 118 node networks
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Figure 4.4: Node Degree Distributions of the Original and Generated 247 node networks
4.1 Robustness Evaluation
The power degradation graphs and node loss graphs for the standard and generated networks
are shown in Fig. 4.5, and Fig. 4.6, respectively. The generated 247 node networks have
an average of about 72.56 MW of load remaining for the worst case, but the standard 247
node network has less than 5 MW of load remaining, at stability. Similarly, the generated
networks have an average of 76 nodes remaining in the network at stability, whereas the
standard network has about 4 nodes remaining. However, it must be noted that there is just
one or very few links which cause a worst-case damage. Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8 represent the
power degradation and node loss graphs for the standard and generated 179 node networks.
Similarly, the power degradation and node loss graphs for the standard and generated 118
node networks are shown in Fig. 4.9 and 4.10.
These results pose an interesting consequent question: given that the generated networks
are more robust than the standard networks, what are their topological characteristics, and
how can we modify the standard topologies to become more robust? In the following section,
we address the first part of the question, and a comparison of the topology metrics of the
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Figure 4.5: Power Degradation graph for Standard and Generated 247 node networks
standard and generated networks is done in the next section.
4.2 Comparison of network metrics
To characterize the generated and standard networks, we computed three metrics:
1. Characteristic path length: The average shortest distance over all the possible pairs
of nodes in the network.
2. Diameter: The longest shortest path between any two nodes of the graph.
3. Clustering coefficient: Measure of the degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster
together.
These metrics are discussed in more details in Chapter 1.
Results obtained computing these three metrics are shown in table 4.1. It is important
to note that the diameter and characteristic path lengths are measured here in terms of
shortest path in number of hops; real power flow routing is consequently not considered.
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Figure 4.6: Node Loss graph for Standard and Generated 247 node networks
Figure 4.7: Power Degradation graph for Standard and Generated 179 node networks
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Figure 4.8: Node Loss graph for Standard and Generated 179 node networks
Figure 4.9: Power Degradation graph for Standard and Generated 118 node networks
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Figure 4.10: Node Loss graph for Standard and Generated 118 node networks
Nodes Network Path Length Diam Cluster Coeff
Standard 9.646 24 0.102
G1 5.162 10 0.0
247 G2 5.191 11 0.008
G3 5.263 13 0.016
G4 5.190 11 0.006
G5 5.300 12 0.001
Standard 12.382 34 0.089
G1 5.968 14 0.012
179 G2 6.058 15 0.0
G3 5.661 13 0.012
G4 5.683 13 0.004
G5 5.616 12 0.001
Standard 6.309 9 0.165
G1 4.223 9 0.032
118 G2 4.259 9 0.008
G3 4.278 9 0.004
G4 4.348 9 0.004
G5 4.258 9 0.025
Table 4.1: Differences in Characteristics of Standard and Generated Networks, in terms of
shortest distance or hop count
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As seen from the table, the characteristic path length of the generated networks is shorter
as compared to the standard networks. The shorter characteristic path length ensures
better global connectivity of the network. This is because the characteristic path length is
the average of the shortest paths in the network. This feature of the generated networks
contributes to their robustness.
Among two networks of the same size and same average node degree, the network with
a shorter diameter would be more robust than the one with a longer diameter. This is
again because a shorter diameter ensures better global connectivity. When nodes or links
are removed from a path connecting a source and a destination, the diameter becomes
longer. For a completely fragmented network, the diameter would be infinite. Hence for a
network without any disruptions, a shorter diameter implies better global connectivity. As
seen from the table, the 247 and 179 node generated networks have a smaller diameter as
compared to the standard networks. Smaller diameters, thus, contribute to greater network
robustness. Each of the generated 118 node networks have the same diameter as the standard
network indicating that the increased robustness of the generated 118 node networks is not
contributed to by the diameter for the 118 node networks. In this case, it is mostly due to
a shorter characteristic path length.
The clustering coefficient of the generated networks is very small as compared to the
standard networks because of the random nature of the generated networks. Although
the clustering coefficient does not seem to show any direct effects on the robustness of the
networks, we see a considerable difference between the clustering coefficients of the standard
networks and each of their respective generated networks. This may be considered as an
indication that the clustering coefficient might have a role to play in the robustness of the
power grid networks. It would be interesting to do a robustness evaluation based on the
clustering coefficient, as it is independent of any routing schemes. However, this evaluation
will be considered as future work at this point.
25
Chapter 5
Mitigation Strategies for Cascading
Failures
Load shedding has been a classical method to prevent the power systems from getting
overloaded due to excessive demand from the consumers. In other words, whenever the
demand for electric power exceeds the generation, parts of the distribution system must be
disconnected to protect the system and to stop the cascade. We suggest two mitigation
strategies, based on load reduction, to reduce the effect of cascading failures: Homogeneous
Load Reduction and Targeted Range-Based Load Reduction.
These strategies are discussed below:
5.1 Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy
This strategy is very similar to what is commonly known as ’brownouts’. In this strategy,
we reduce a given percentage of load for each of the nodes in the network in the event of
a failure. This reduction of load helps to keep the other nodes and links operating below
their maximum limit and makes room for the redistribution of the excess load due to the
failure. We perform a series of simulations and reduce the load in steps of five from 0% to
100%. Each step is a separate simulation, and the final result of each simulation is plotted
on the graph in Fig. 5.1. The horizontal axis represents the percentage of load reduced,
while the vertical axis shows the number of nodes remaining in the system as a result of
26
load reduction or, in other words, the number of nodes protected. About 10% reduction
on all nodes allows about 89% of the nodes of the network to remain functional. In other
words, about 89% nodes are protected by 10% homogeneous reduction of loads. About 99%
of the nodes are protected from failure at 20% reduction. However, the complete protection
of the network takes place at 80% reduction on the network. By reducing about 10% or
20%, a considerable amount of connectivity is achieved but at the cost of a few disconnected
nodes. It must, however, be noted that even if total protection of the network is achieved,
there will be some power degradation due to the initial failure.
Figure 5.1: Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy on the original 247 node network
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5.2 Targeted Range-Based Load Reduction strategy
The Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy is very simple to implement because it requires
the same amount of reduction for each of the nodes in the network. But the drawback of
this strategy is that load is reduced even from the nodes which may not be responsible for
overloading. Thus, we propose a more efficient strategy, the Targeted Range-Based Load
Reduction strategy.
The objective of this strategy is to reduce the load only in a small portion of the network
that will be affected by the re-routing of power due to the initial failure.
If we select a node i from the network and follow it along the adjacent nodes, considering
just one direction of power flow (outgoing), we discover a tree, called the propagation tree,
for node i. Fig. 5.2 would be helpful in understanding the approach. The approach used in
this strategy is to select a node which was connected to the link that failed and discover the
tree for that node. It should also be noted that out of the two nodes connected to the failed
link, the one which was sending power out on that link is used for tree discovery because
this is the node which has to redistribute the power to the adjacent links. Node R represents
the root node in Fig. 5.2. The node R is connected to nodes 1, 2, and 3 referred to as the
first-level nodes. The second step is to find the other neighbors of these first-level nodes.
As seen in the figure, node 1 has two other neighbors, A1 and B1. Out of all the neighbors
of node 1, the root node R and node B1 provide power to node 1. If the magnitude of
power supplied by the root node is higher than that supplied by node B1, it can be said
that the root node is on the maximum power flow path from the generator for node 1. A
maximum power flow path is the path which supplies the highest magnitude of power to a
node from the main generator, as compared to all the other paths. This means that node
1 will be affected by the failure of the link which was connected to the root node. Hence,
node 1 forms a part of the tree and would be used for load reduction so that it can handle
the additional load due to redistribution. Node 1 supplies power to node A1. In the next
step, we consider the other neighbors of node A1 and find out if node 1 is the best supplier
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of power for node A1 or not. If it is, then node A1 forms the next level of the tree and the
procedure is continued for other nodes in a similar way.
There may be some nodes in the propagation tree which may not carry any load but
are simply used to transfer power from one node to the other. We reduce the load from the
nodes in the tree, which carry load and are not source nodes. The tree terminates when it
reaches a source node or a leaf node. A leaf node is the one which is on the periphery of
the network, and has a node degree of one. The discovered tree for a specific link in the
network is shown in Fig. 5.3 and more clearly in Fig. 5.4. The total number of nodes in
the tree is 90 but load is reduced on only 55 of these nodes. All the other nodes have no
load on them. The magnified circular and diamond-shaped nodes are a part of the tree, the
diamond-shaped ones being used for load reduction. The thicker links form a part of the
tree and the broken link is shown dotted.
Figure 5.2: Example showing tree discovery
The Fig. 5.5 shows the load reduction on the tree for the link. The horizontal axis
represents the percentage load reduction on the tree and the vertical axis represents the
number of nodes remaining in the network. As seen, there is no improvement in the network
until 40% reduction. However, at 45% reduction, about 99.5% connectivity is achieved or in
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Figure 5.3: Targeted Range-Based Load Reduction strategy - Load reduction on each of the
diamond-shaped nodes
other words, 99.5% of the network is protected. The behavior of the system again remains
constant until 80% reduction, at which point complete protection of the system is achieved.
But this reduction on the tree is equivalent to a very small reduction in the network, as a
whole. For this specific link, the overall load reduction in the network is less than 0.35%,
as compared to 20-80% in the homogeneous strategy. This strategy, thus, aims at reducing
the load of only a small subset of the nodes in the network, those which will be affected by
the failure and the redistribution dynamics.
Fig. ?? shows the comparison between the two mitigation strategies. The inset shows the
targeted strategy on an expanded scale.
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Figure 5.4: The propagation tree, of node i
Figure 5.5: Load Reduction on the propagation tree
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Figure 5.6: Comparison between Homogeneous and Targeted Load Reduction strategies,
applied on the network. Inset: Targeted Reduction on the network, shown on an
expanded X axis. The cascading can be controlled by just 0.15% load reduction
on the network using the targeted strategy. 0.35% reduction on the network
corresponds to 100% reduction on the tree.
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Chapter 6
Results, Conclusions, and Future
Work
6.1 Results
The analysis of the power grid networks gave us the following results:
1. Power Degradation and Node Loss: The power degradation graphs in Fig. 4.5, Fig. 4.7,
and Fig. 4.9 show that the worst case cascade stops at an earlier stage and causes less
damage in the case of generated networks. The node loss graphs in Fig. 4.6, 4.8,
and 4.10 also indicate that stability is achieved earlier in a generated network as
compared to the standard network. In this case, the topologies were generated so that
the network characteristics such as number of links and nodes, along with average
and maximum node degrees are the same as the original networks and only the link
connections were changed and made random. This shows that a change in topology
can affect the robustness of the network. However, attempts are being made to reduce
the level of rewiring of links and incorporating geographical information to decrease
the randomness in the networks.
2. Network metrics: As seen from Table 4.1, the characteristic path length of the gener-
ated networks is shorter than that of the standard networks. Similarly, the diameter
of the generated networks is also smaller than that of the standard networks. This
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is because of the random nature of the generated networks. A shorter characteristic
path length and diameter contribute to better global connectivity of the network and
consequently, to its robustness. The generated networks have a smaller clustering co-
efficient as compared to the standard networks. However, clustering coefficient is a
local measure and does not affect the robustness of the network significantly.
3. Mitigation strategies: The Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy is similar to the
classical load shedding techniques employed in power grids. It resembles ’brownouts’,
in which a certain percentage of load is reduced for each node in the network. This
strategy is very easy to implement but requires higher amount of load reduction on
all the nodes for the protection of the network. The Targeted Range-Based Load
Reduction strategy is very efficient as compared to the Homogeneous strategy as it
requires a very small amount of load reduction on a small subset of nodes, to protect
the network.
6.2 Conclusions
The analysis of the power grid network carried out in this thesis, and the above results
lead us to some interesting conclusions. The topology of the power grid network greatly
contributes to its robustness. It determines the connectivity of the network and hence gives
an idea about which connections may impart more strength to the network. However, the
feasibility of modeling the real power grid networks according to the presented analysis
must be investigated. The generated networks are better connected than the standard
networks because of shorter characteristic path length and shorter diameter. They show
more resistance to cascading failures because of their topology.
Among the possible strategies that can be used to reduce the severity of the cascading
effects, in this thesis, we have proposed and tested two methods, the Homogeneous load
reduction strategy and the Targeted load reduction strategy. The Homogeneous load reduc-
tion strategy is similar to the classical load reduction strategy, in which an equal percentage
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of load is reduced for all the nodes present in the network after an initial failure. The
Targeted range based load reduction strategy is a newly proposed strategy which aims at
reducing a very small percentage of the load for only a subset of the nodes in the network,
which will be directly affected by the re-routing of power due to the initial failure.
The Homogeneous strategy is easier to implement but the Targeted strategy is more efficient
as it requires a small percentage of reduction on a small subset of nodes.
6.3 Future Work
There are some open problems that should be investigated in future:
Work is going on to find an expression for weights using the power flow equations so
that the shortest paths coincide exactly with the maximum power flow paths. This will
enable us to find the paths by a simple addition of weights. The use of power flow equations
would ensure that the flow dynamics of the networks are considered while computing the
topological metrics.
Efforts are being directed towards the implementation of islanding as a mitigation strat-
egy, in conjunction with distributed renewable energy. Using optimization techniques to
obtain feasible points for disconnection of node clusters and to ensure load balancing in the
process will be an interesting point of research in complex networks.
We are also working towards determining a threshold value for load reduction in the
Targeted range-based load reduction strategy. As seen from Fig. 5.5, there is a sudden
change in the number of protected nodes at a particular percentage of load reduction.
However, this is for a particular link. We intend on finding a general expression for all links
in the network.
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Appendix A
DC Power Flow Model
The model has mainly been used for analysis of the topological features of the power grid
network. Because the resistance are smaller compared with the reactances of those lines,
the resistances are neglected to simplify the solutions. The power grid network is being
considered as a DC power flow model and the shunt admittances of transmission lines have
also been neglected. The line inductances govern the amount of power that flows through
the links. Node 1, which is the generator, has been selected as the reference node, and the
synchronous condensers have been neglected.
A.1 DC Power Flow Model
We cannot use metrics such as number of hops or shortest distance to find the best path
from the generator to the destination node, in case of a power grid. This inability to use
such metrics arises from the fact that the amount of power flowing through a link depends
upon its impedance. In the rest of this section we use capital letters for matrices and the
corresponding small letter for their respective elements.
The map of the power grid in the form of nodes and links is used to create a weighted adja-
cency matrix X of size NxN , where N is the total number of nodes in the network. When
nodes i and j are connected, xij is a positive non-zero entry representing the impedances of
the transmission line between nodes (buses) i and j, and it is zero otherwise. A matrix B
is created from the adjacency matrix using the following formula38:
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bij =
−1
xij
, i = 1, 2, ...N, j = 1, 2, ...N, ∀ i 6= j (A.1)
bii =
N∑
j=1
−bij (A.2)
The system ground is usually the reference. However, in simplifying things, all the shunt
admittances have been dropped. Thus, the reference is lost.This means that the B matrix
obtained from the above equation will be a singular matrix. In further equations, we will
need to calculate the inverse of the B matrix which cannot be done if it is singular. To
overcome this, one of the generators is selected as the reference node and is assigned an
angle of zero radians38. Then, all the calculated angles are referred to this reference, and
the row and column corresponding to this reference node in {B} are dropped to produce a
non-singular {B} and its inverse is calculated. The phase angle, δi for node i is calculated
using the inverted B matrix and a N -1x1 load vector Λ. The elements of this vector λi
represents the load on each node.
∆ = B−1Λ (A.3)
where
∆ = {δ2, δ3, ..., δN}T
Λ = {λ2, λ3, ..., λN}T
We assume a lossless transmission line. Thus, the total power going into a node is the
sum of the total power coming out of it and the power consumed by the load at that node.
Power pij in each link (i, j) must be calculated as follows:
pij = −bijδij = δi − δj
xij
, i = 1, ...., N, j = 1, ...., N, i 6= j (A.4)
where δij = δi - δj
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The power pi on each node i can be calculated as:
pi =
∑
j∈N(i)
pij =
∑
j∈N(i)
−bijδij, ∀ i = 2, ..., N (A.5)
where N(i) is the set of nodes which are neighbors of i.
For the generator node,
p1 =
∑
j∈N(1)
p1j =
∑
j∈N(1)
−b1jδ1j (A.6)
where N(1) is the set of neighbors of node 1 and pi is the total generated power.
In this thesis, we have assumed that the power generated satisfies the total demand in the
network.
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Appendix B
Back Tracing Algorithm for Optimal
Paths
B.1 Algorithm
The steps of the algorithm are described below. The algorithm back traces the path from
the destination node to the generator.
1. Search for the neighbors of the selected destination node from the adjacency matrix.
A given node is a neighbor if
bij 6= 0,∀j 6= i (B.1)
2. We assume outgoing power to be positive and incoming power to be negative. We se-
lect the neighboring nodes which send power into the destination node. In other words,
the nodes providing power to the destination node are candidate previous nodes in
the optimal path.
Pij < 0,∀j 6= i⇒ (B.2)
j is a possible candidate for the previous node in the path
3. We compare the magnitudes of link power between the destination node and each
candidate previous node and select the one with the highest magnitude.
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|Pij| > |Pik| ⇒ (B.3)
previous node = j
Else previous node = k where j, k ∈ neighbors of i
4. Now the previous node becomes the destination node and the same back tracing pro-
cedure is applied to search for its previous node and so on till we reach the generator.
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